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Chapter 2: Micro, Macro, and Mechanisms 
Petri Ylikoski 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter takes a fresh look at micro-macro relations in the social sciences from the 
point of view of the mechanistic account of explanation. Traditionally, micro-macro 
issues have been assimilated to the problem of methodological individualism (Udéhn 
2001, Zahle 2006). It is not my intention to resurrect this notoriously unfruitful 
controversy. On the contrary, the main thrust of this chapter is to show that the cul-de-sac 
of that debate can be avoided if we give up some of its presuppositions. The debate about 
methodological individualism is based on assumptions about explanation, and once we 
change those assumptions, the whole argumentative landscape changes. 
The idea that social scientific explanations are based on causal mechanisms rather 
than covering laws has become increasingly popular over the last twenty years or so 
(Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). Interestingly, a similar mechanistic turn has occurred also 
in the philosophies of biology and psychology (Wright and Bechtel 2007). Until recently, 
the connections between these two emerging traditions for thinking about mechanisms 
have been rare. The aim of this chapter is to employ ideas developed by philosophers of 
biology to address some issues that the advocates of mechanisms in the social sciences 
have not yet systematically addressed. I argue that ideas about levels of explanation and 
reductive research strategies, which were originally developed in the context of cell 
biology and neuroscience, can be fruitfully adapted to the social sciences. They can both 
strengthen the case for mechanism-based explanations in the social sciences and bring the 
philosophy of social science debates closer to social scientific practice. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I will take a look at recent 
work on mechanism-based explanation. While I suggest that the mechanistic account of 
explanation presupposes some more fundamental ideas about explanatory relevance and 
causation, I also argue that it provides a fruitful tool for thinking about micro-macro 
relations in the social sciences. In the second section, I will criticize a common 
philosophical way of formulating the micro-macro issue and provide my own 
characterization that is not dependent on the assumption that there is a unique or 
comprehensive micro level. The third section introduces the distinction between causal 
and constitutive explanation, and argues that this distinction helps to make sense of the 
call for microfoundations in the social sciences. The final section will take on a doctrine 
that I call intentional fundamentalism, and it challenges the idea that intentional 
explanations have a privileged position in the social sciences. 
2.2 Mechanism-based explanation 
The idea of mechanism-based explanation has been developed independently among 
social scientists (Harré 1970; Elster 1989, 2007; Little 1991; Hedström and Swedberg 
1998; Hedström 2005; for a review see Hedström and Ylikoski 2010) and philosophers of 
biology (Bechtel 2006, 2008; Craver 2007; Darden 2006; Wimsatt 2007). In the social 
sciences, the idea of causal mechanism has been used mainly as a tool for methodological 
criticism, while in the philosophy of biology the motivation has been that of finding a 
descriptively adequate account of biological explanation. Despite these separate origins 
and motivations, both traditions are clearly building on similar ideas about scientific 
explanation. For example, both share the same dissatisfaction with the covering law 
account of explanation (Hedström 2005; Craver 2007). 
There is no consensus on the right definition of a causal mechanism. Although 
some theorists find such a situation frustrating, I do not think this constitutes a real 
problem. The entities and processes studied by different sciences are quite heterogeneous, 
and it is probably impossible to propose a mechanism definition that would be both 
informative and cover all the prominent examples of mechanisms. Some disciplines, such 
as cell biology (Bechtel 2006) and the neurosciences (Craver 2007), study highly 
integrated systems, whereas others, such as evolutionary biology and the social sciences, 
study more dispersed phenomena (Kuorikoski 2009), so it is more plausible to think that 
informative characterizations of mechanisms are field specific. The task of a 
philosophical account is to show how these exemplars are related to general ideas about 
explanation, evidence, and causation, not to engage in verbal sophistry. However, it is 
possible to give some general characteristics of mechanisms. 
First, a mechanism is always a mechanism for something; they are identified by 
the kind of effect or phenomenon they produce. Second, a mechanism is an irreducibly 
causal notion. It refers to the entities of a causal process that produces the effect of 
interest. Third, a mechanism has a structure. When a mechanism-based explanation 
opens the black box, it makes visible how the participating entities and their properties, 
activities, and relations produce the effect of interest. The focus on mechanisms breaks 
up the original explanation-seeking why-question into a series of smaller questions about 
the causal process: What are the participating entities, and what are their relevant 
properties? How are the interactions of these entities organized (both spatially and 
temporally)? What factors could prevent or modify the outcome? Finally, there is a 
hierarchy of mechanisms. While a mechanism at one level presupposes or takes for 
granted the existence of certain entities with characteristic properties and activities, it is 
expected that there are lower-level mechanisms that will explain them. In other words, 
the explanations employed by one field always bottom out somewhere. However, this 
fundamental status of certain entities, properties, and activities for a given mechanism is 
only relative, as they are legitimate targets of mechanistic explanation in another field. Of 
course, this chain of explanations ends somewhere—there are no mechanism-based 
explanations for fundamental (physical) processes (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). 
Although the mechanism-based account is often presented simply as an idea about 
scientific explanation, the notion of mechanism is associated with a wider set of ideas 
about scientific knowledge. For example, there are ideas about the justification of causal 
claims, the heuristics of causal discovery, the presentation of explanatory information, 
and the organization of scientific knowledge (Ylikoski 2011). There is no doubt that these 
not yet clearly articulated ideas partly explain the appeal of the approach. For example, as 
I will show later in this chapter, claims about the explanatory role of mechanisms are 
often confused with claims about their relevance to the justification of causal claims (see 
also Kincaid, this volume). 
While I think all the above ideas are important advances in understanding 
explanatory reasoning in science, it is not necessary to assume that the notion of 
mechanism is the ultimate solution to all problems in the theory of explanation. On the 
contrary, the mechanistic theory presupposes accounts of explanatory relevance, 
causation, and the nature of generalizations that provide the basis for mechanisms. The 
notion of mechanism should not be treated like a black box. I have argued elsewhere 
(Hedström and Ylikoski 2010; Ylikoski 2011) that if the mechanistic ideas are combined 
with the theory of explanation developed by James Woodward (2002, 2003), we can get 
quite far in solving these problems. While for the present purposes we do not have to 
consider in detail the relation between mechanisms and generalizations, some comments 
on explanatory relevance are in order as later arguments depend on it. 
A mechanism-based explanation describes the causal process selectively. It does 
not aim at an exhaustive account of all details but seeks to capture the crucial elements of 
the process by abstracting away the irrelevant details. The relevance of entities, their 
properties, and their interactions is determined by their ability to make a relevant 
difference to the outcome of interest. If the presence of an entity or of changes in its 
properties or activities truly does not make any difference to the effect to be explained, it 
can be ignored. This counterfactual criterion of relevance implies that mechanism-based 
explanations involve counterfactual reasoning about possible changes and their 
consequences (Ylikoski 2011). A natural way to understand these causal counterfactuals 
is to understand them as claims about the consequences of ideal causal interventions 
(Woodward 2003, 2008). The causal counterfactual tells us what would have happened to 
the effect if the cause had been subject to a surgical intervention that would not have 
affected anything else in the causal configuration. An advantage of the interventionist 
account of causation is that it allows talking about causal dependencies in every context 
where the notion of intervention makes sense. Unlike some other theories of causation, 
such as various process theories, it is level-blind and applicable to special sciences such 
as cell biology or sociology. 
2.2.1 Mechanisms and Reductive Explanation 
One of the distinctive features of the mechanistic approach to explanation is that it 
reorients the issues related to reductionism and reductive explanation. In one sense the 
mechanistic way of thinking is thoroughly reductionist: It attempts to explain activities of 
mechanisms in terms of their component parts and their activities, and then subjects the 
component mechanisms to the same treatment. In this sense, the reductive research 
strategy has probably been the single most effective research strategy in the history of 
modern science. However, there is another sense in which mechanism-based explanations 
are clearly nonreductionist: Although they do refer to the micro level, they do not replace 
or eliminate the higher-level facts nor the explanations citing them. Rather than serving to 
reduce one level to another, mechanisms bridge levels (Darden 2006; Craver 2007; 
Wright and Bechtel 2007; Richardson 2007; McCauley 2007; Wimsatt 2007). 
The mechanistic account of reductive explanation differs significantly from the 
traditional philosophical accounts of intertheoretical reduction that conceive reduction as 
a derivation of one theory from another (Richardson 2007; McCauley 2007). The 
mechanical account of reductive explanation does not start with a strongly idealized 
picture of a discipline-wide theory that contains all knowledge about its level. Nor does it 
conceive reduction as a deductive relation between such theories (or their corrected 
versions). Rather, reductive mechanistic explanations are constructed piecemeal with a 
focus on particular explanatory targets. While there is an assumption that everything is 
mechanistically explainable and a presumption that ultimately all mechanistic accounts 
are mutually compatible, there is no overarching effort to combine them into one grand 
theory that would cover all the phenomena that the scientific field studies. Also, contrary 
to the traditional accounts that conceive reduction as elimination or replacement, the 
mechanisms are inherently multilevel. The components and their operations occur and are 
investigated at one level, whereas the mechanism itself and its activities occur and are 
investigated at a higher level. In this sense accounts of mechanisms often have the 
character of interfield theory (Darden 2006). This makes it difficult to characterize the 
reductive understanding provided by mechanical explanations as deductive relations 
between independent theories. 
The mechanistic stance also gives reasons for rethinking the notion of levels. 
According to the traditional layer-cake conception, there is a neat hierarchical layering of 
entities into levels across phenomena, and the scientific disciplines (e.g., physics, 
chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology) are distinguished from each other by the level 
of the phenomena that they are studying (see Oppenheim and Putnam 1958). From the 
mechanistic point of view, this way of thinking unnecessarily drives together levels of 
nature and science, and misleadingly suggests that the levels are both comprehensive and 
the same independently of the investigative context (Craver 2007). The actual scientific 
disciplines do not match neatly with the metaphysical picture of levels of organization or 
reality. And while there are many problems in a serious characterization of the 
metaphysical picture of levels, there do not seem to be any particularly good reasons to 
accept such a metaphysical constraint for an account of scientific explanation. 
The notion of the levels of mechanism plays an important role in the mechanistic 
account but is free from many of the traditional assumptions about levels. The levels of 
mechanisms are perspectival in the sense that the levels are dependent on the explanatory 
target. Macro-level facts are explained by appealing to micro-level processes, entities, 
and relations, but these items belong to the micro level just because they are required for 
the full explanation of the macro fact, not because they belong to some predetermined 
micro level. Whatever is needed for explaining the macro fact is regarded as belonging to 
the same level. However, there is no guarantee that these components would always be at 
the same level in all possible explanatory contexts. Nor it is obvious that the micro-level 
entities and processes that account for these components would be in any simple sense 
from the same level. For every hierarchy of mechanisms, there is a clear hierarchy of 
levels of mechanisms, but these levels are local. There is no reason to assume that 
separate hierarchies of mechanism levels would together produce the neatly delineated 
and comprehensive levels of nature assumed in the traditional layer-cake model (Craver 
2007). 
These views have a number of interesting consequences for traditional ways of 
thinking about reductive explanation and the explanatory role of microfoundations in the 
social sciences. For example, once we give up the outdated deductive model of theory 
reduction, many of the traditional fixations of the methodological individualism debate 
simply become meaningless. For example, there is no need to provide individualistically 
acceptable redefinitions of macro-social notions because the explanation of macro facts is 
no longer conceived as a logical derivation. Similarly, the search for any bridge laws 
between theories becomes pointless. This has the consequence that the key anti-
reductionist argument about multiple realization loses much of its significance. From the 
point of view of mechanistic explanation, multiple realization is simply an interesting 
empirical observation that does not pose any serious threat to the possibility of explaining 
macro properties in terms of micro properties and relations. Just as the sciences have 
learned to live with the fact of alternative causes, they can learn to live with the 
phenomenon of multiple realization. 
The advocates of the mechanism-based approach in the social sciences have 
noticed some of these consequences. For example, they have largely given up the old 
ideas about reductive explanation and have instead emphasized the importance of 
microfoundations (Elster 1989; Little 1991). However, I do not think that all the 
implications of the mechanistic perspective have been taken into account in the 
philosophy of social sciences. This is visible, for example, in the fact that quite often the 
mechanistic approach is associated with methodological individualism (Elster 1989). 
Similarly, much of the debate about micro-macro relations is still focused on arguments 
that are based on a premechanistic understanding of reductive explanation (Sawyer 2005; 
Zahle 2006). 
The aim of this chapter is to sketch what a consistently mechanistic way to think 
about micro-macro relations would look like and to show that some of the key 
presuppositions of the traditional debate about methodological individualism should be 
given up. One of these is the assumption of a comprehensive, unique, and privileged 
individual level. The notion of comprehensiveness refers to the idea that there is a 
consistent and well-defined individual level that is sufficient to cover all social 
phenomena and that would serve as a reduction basis for all nonindividual social notions. 
Uniqueness refers to the assumption that in all social explanations, the micro level would 
always be the same level, for example, the level of intentional rational action. Finally, the 
notion of privileged refers to the presumption that explanations in terms of this special 
level have some special explanatory qualities that set them apart from explanations from 
other levels. In the following, I will challenge all three assumptions and argue that once 
they are given up, we can approach the micro-macro issues in the social sciences in a 
more clear-headed manner. 
2.3 Rethinking the macro 
A popular argumentative strategy among anti-individualists has been to borrow ideas 
from the philosophy of mind. They are inspired by the arguments for nonreductive 
materialism, so they build their argument based on an analogy with the mind-brain 
relation. Given that these arguments are not very mind specific—it is a general practice 
just to talk about M- and P-predicates—their appeal is understandable. The ideas of 
supervenience and multiple realization seem to provide a neat way to argue against 
reductionism, at least if one accepts the traditional idea of derivational reduction. While 
there are reasons to suspect that the notion of supervenience is less illuminating than is 
often assumed (Horgan 1993; Kim 1993) and that the traditional view of reduction does 
not completely collapse under multiple realization (Kim 1998), we can set these issues 
aside as their relevance presupposes a premechanistic account of reductive explanation. 
Here I want to focus on the mind-brain analogy as I think it is misleading. 
The mind-brain analogy is inappropriate because it mischaracterizes the nature of 
the social scientific micro-macro problem. The central problem in the philosophy of mind 
is to figure out how the explanations provided by psychological theories that employ 
mental concepts are related to the accounts of the brain’s working provided by the 
neurosciences. The challenge is to relate two levels of description that are fundamentally 
talking about the same thing. The (nondualist) antireductionist position does not typically 
challenge the causal sufficiency of the neural-level facts. The setup is quite different in 
the social scientific micro-macro debates. 
The problem in the social sciences is not that of bridging a comprehensive and 
exhaustive individual-level understanding of social processes (the analogue to the 
idealized knowledge of the brain) to a more social or holistic description (that would be 
analogue to the idealized psychological theories employing the mental vocabulary). It is 
typical for anti-individualists to challenge the causal sufficiency of individual facts. They 
often claim that the facts about individuals allowed by the individualist are either not 
sufficient to account for all social facts or the individualists are cheating by accepting 
facts that are not properly individualistic. This is because the issue is not really that of 
relations between two comprehensive (and potentially competing) levels of description, 
but that of seeing how local facts about individuals and their social interactions are 
related to large-scale facts about groups, organizations, and societies. So, the relation is 
really more like the one between the whole brain and its parts than the mind and the 
brain. While this contrast is useful for highlighting the inappropriateness of the mind-
brain analogy, I do not want to develop it further as there are many problems with the 
organ-society analogy. It is better to skip all the brainy analogies and to take a fresh look 
at the micro-macro problem as the social scientists face it. 
A useful starting point is the observation that macro social facts are typically 
supra-individual: They are attributed to groups, communities, populations, and 
organizations, but not to individuals. There might be some attributes that apply both to 
individuals and collectives, but typically macro social properties, relations, and events are 
such that they are not about individuals. 
Another salient feature of many social micro-macro relations is the part-whole 
relationship. One way or another, the macro social entities are made of their constituting 
parts. Usually this relation of constitution is more than mere mereological aggregation or 
simple material constitution. First, many social wholes are composed of a heterogeneous 
set of entities; there are intentional agents, their ideas, and material artifacts. Second, in 
all interesting examples of social wholes, the relations between the components play an 
important role. (Similarly, often the relations between social wholes and between the 
social whole and its environment are also important.) However, the important thing is 
that the part-whole relationship makes it possible to see the micro-macro relation as a 
question of scale: The difference between micro and macro is the difference between 
small- and large-scale social phenomena. 
I do not propose that we can simply define the micro-macro contrast as an issue of 
scale. All differences in scale do not constitute a meaningful micro-macro relation, and 
the heterogeneous nature of macro social facts makes it difficult to characterize the 
additional requirements for their defining features. However, I do want to suggest that it 
provides a fruitful way to think about micro-macro relations and an antidote for the 
tendency to see parallels in the philosophy of mind. 
Thinking of the micro-macro issue as an issue of scale makes it possible to 
conceive of it as being without a unique micro level. Whereas the contrast between 
‘individual’ and ‘social’ levels is categorical, the contrast between small and large is 
relative and allows a continuum of various sizes. Depending on the application, the micro 
entities could be individuals, families, firms, or groups. This flexibility is in accordance 
with the way social scientists think. They do not assume that micro is always about one 
specific set of entities. 
Another consequence is that whether an attribute is a macro or micro property 
depends on what it is contrasted with. A friendship relationship is a macro property from 
the psychological point of view, but a micro property when considered from the point of 
view of the social networks within a community. Rather than being set a priori, the 
contrast between micro and macro depends on one’s explanatory interests. For example, 
international politics and organizational sociology construct the micro-macro contrast 
quite differently. In the former, states and other organizations are often treated as 
individuals, whereas in the latter, the organizations and their properties are the macro 
reality to be explained. Similarly, an economist studying market processes can treat firms 
and households as the micro level, while for disciplines such as industrial organization 
and family sociology, they are the macro items that require explanation. 
From the point of view of a mechanistic philosophy of science, this flexibility is 
not surprising. The same dependence of levels on epistemic concerns is also observable 
in the biological sciences. The cell biologists or neuroscientists do not think in terms of 
comprehensive or unique micro levels either. The levels of mechanisms found there 
depend on the explanatory concerns, not on a priori ontological considerations. This is 
not worrisome for the mechanistic point of view, as the key assumption is that whatever 
is found at the micro level can always be turned to a macro-level explanandum for 
another set of enquiries. 
The social macro properties do not constitute a unified kind, so it makes sense to 
characterize them with a sample of examples rather than with a general definition. The 
following classification of typical sociological macro social properties is not intended to 
be exhaustive of sociology or the social sciences in general. There are many parts of 
macro social reality that fall between my four categories. However, I hope the four 
examples can be used to illustrate the applicability of the scale perspective. 
2.3.1 (1) Statistical properties of a population 
A major concern for sociology is the various statistical attributes of populations. Among 
these are distributions and frequencies. Sociologists are interested in both distributions of 
attributes to various kinds of individuals and distributions of individuals with certain 
attributes to social positions and spatial locations. For example, when they are studying 
the ethnic segregation of cities, comparing societies in terms of inequality, or describing 
the social stratification of a society, they are attempting to account for distributions. 
Another relevant property of distributions are frequencies. Sociologists are interested in 
typical, rare, dominant, or marginal behaviors, beliefs, or attitudes within a specified 
population. Similarly, they are interested in ratios of attributes such as unemployment or 
incarceration within the population. So, when sociologists are studying changes in racial 
prejudices over time, comparing the level of conformism between communities or 
tracking the changes in the level of union memberships, they are interested in explaining 
frequencies. 
All these statistical macro social properties are inferred (or estimated) from data 
about the members of a population. There is no other way to access them. However, it 
does not make any sense to attribute these properties to individual units. Another 
important thing about these macro social facts is that the units of these statistics do not 
have to be individuals; they can as well be families or firms. It is noticeable that 
statistical macro properties are in no way dependent on the members’ beliefs and 
attitudes about them. The members of the population can have false, or even crazy, 
beliefs about distributions and frequencies that characterize their own society. 
While the statistical properties of populations usually only serve as explananda in 
the social sciences, they do have some legitimate and nonreducible explanatory uses. For 
example, in the cases of frequency-dependent causation (e.g., cases in which the causal 
effect of an individual having a certain property depends on the frequency of that 
property in the population), the statistical facts are the crucial difference makers. 
Similarly, in many social scientific explanations, the correlations between various 
variables (for example, wealth, education, taste, and place of residence) play an important 
role in accounting for individual differences in behavior and attitudes. Both of these cases 
are quite easily conceived as cases of larger-scale facts influencing smaller-scale 
phenomena, while other ways to think about levels are not as natural. 
2.3.2 (2) Topologies of social networks within a population 
Sociologists are also interested in relations and interactions between individuals. When 
considered together, these relations constitute networks of social relations within the 
population. A social network can be regarded as a map of all of the relevant ties between 
the members of a specified population. When sociologists are studying the spread of 
information within an organization, comparing groups with respect to their level of 
network clustering or analyzing the brokering opportunities of an individual occupying a 
structural hole (i.e., a position between two networks that are not otherwise connected), 
they are examining social networks. 
The importance of social networks is increasingly being recognized in the social 
sciences, and social network analysis is becoming increasingly popular in various social 
sciences. Social network analysis is based on the observation that networks have many 
interesting (formal) properties, such as centralization, cohesion, density, and structural 
cohesion (Scott 2000). While the social network is inferred from knowledge about 
individual relationships, the properties of the network are prototypical macro properties. 
It does not make any sense to apply these attributes to individual nodes of the network. 
Similarly to statistical properties, the units of network analysis are flexible. There is no 
requirement that the nodes of the network (the members of the population) are persons. 
They can also be groups, families, organizations, or even states. 
The properties of social networks serve both as the explananda and the 
explanantia in sociology. As an example of the latter, consider the notion of a structural 
hole (Burt 1992), which is used to explain the differences in agents’ ability to access 
information and in their opportunities to influence social processes. In these explanations 
the structure of the network plays an irreducible role, and it is quite natural to think of the 
social network as a large-scale social phenomenon influencing local interactions between 
individuals. In contrast, it is very difficult to think about them in terms of social and 
individual levels. As social networks are attributes of the population, it would be quite a 
stretch to call social networks individual properties. But if they are macro-level 
properties, what would be the individual-level properties that could be regarded as their 
bases? Collections of relevant individual relations, one might suggest, but that would be 
just a vague way to talk about networks. Things are simpler if one does not have to bother 
with such questions. A network is simply a more extensive entity that constituted by 
more local relations and it can have properties that are not properties of its components. 
2.3.3 (3) Communal properties 
By communal properties I refer to social scientific notions that apply to specific 
communities, but not to isolated individuals. Among these notions are such things as 
culture, customs, social norms, and so on. For example, cultural differences are primarily 
between groups, not between individuals. Similarly, social norms and customs are 
properties of communities—attributing them to solitary individuals does not make sense. 
Many of these notions do not have precise definitions, and their explanatory uses are 
often confusing (Turner 1994; Ylikoski 2003), but they do have an important role in the 
social sciences. 
While communal properties are attributed to groups, they are quite 
straightforwardly based on facts about individuals. Underlying these notions is the idea 
that the members of a group share certain beliefs, expectations, preferences, and habits. 
However, it is crucial that the sharing of these individual attributes is not purely 
accidental: The members have these individual properties because the other members of 
the group have them. The sharing of these properties is due to continuing interaction. For 
example, the existence of a social custom presupposes that the novices learn specific 
expectations and habits when they become members and that the members of the group 
stick to these expectations and habits because others also do so. Underlying the (relative) 
unity of a culture are facts about the shared origins of the ideas, values, and practices of 
the members and their constant interaction with each other. Similarly, the cohesion of a 
culture is based on the frequency of interactions with the group and the rarity of 
interactions with outsiders, not on any kind of higher-level influence on individuals. 
Descriptions of customs, social norms, and cultures are always based on 
idealization and abstraction. Members of a community never have exactly the same ideas, 
preferences, or routines. That would be a miracle, given what is known about human 
learning and communication (Sperber 1996). There is always some variation among the 
members, no matter how comprehensive the socialization processes are. However, these 
idealized descriptions are still useful. They draw attention to features of the group that are 
typical and salient when it is contrasted with some other group. 
Although communal properties, as I have described them, are tied to a social 
community defined by frequent interactions, the boundaries of these communities are 
fluid. This makes it possible to describe culture on various scales—for example, on the 
levels of a village, a local area, and a nation. However, descriptions on larger scales are 
bound to be more abstract and less rich in detail as individual variation takes its toll. The 
same flexibility that characterizes statistical and network properties applies also to 
communal properties, which can also be attributed to nonpersonal units. For example, it 
is possible to describe social norms that govern interactions between organizations. 
When we consider communal properties as idealizing abstractions from shared 
individual properties, there is no need to refer to them as any kind of autonomous level of 
reality. They just describe more extensive facts than descriptions of the individual 
attitudes, habits, and preferences that constitute them. The scale perspective also appears 
natural when the explanatory use of communal properties is considered. For example, 
when we are explaining the behavior of an individual by appealing to social norms, we 
are referring to larger-scale facts about the group members that are causally relevant to 
the micro-level behavior. There is no need to postulate a separate realm of norms to 
understand what is happening. It is just that the expectations and responses of the other 
group members influence the individual’s judgments about appropriate behavior. 
2.3.4 (4) Organizations and their properties 
Organizations such as states, firms, parties, churches, and sport clubs are important parts 
of the social reality. While the community that is the basis for communal properties is not 
often clearly demarcated, a clear demarcation is often the case with organizations. They 
usually have specified criteria for membership, at least for the operational members. They 
also have rules that define the rights and duties of members and the roles of various 
functionaries. These (written or nonwritten) rules make it possible for organizations to 
have stability and continuity, so that it makes sense to talk about their continuing 
existence when their functionaries are replaced and the members change. Furthermore, 
many organizations exist (and are defined) in the context of other organizations, so one 
has pay special attention to context when attempting to make sense of organizations. 
Organizations as entities can have many properties that are not properties of their 
members. They can even have goals that are not the personal goals of their members, and 
some organizations are treated as legal persons. This has convinced many that 
organizations are real entities that should be treated as a separate ontological category. I 
do not have strong opinions about issues of ontological bookkeeping, as it is remembered 
that organizations are human artifacts that are always made of persons, their ideas about 
the rules, and often, of material artifacts. Whatever the organization does, is done by its 
members in its name. It is of crucial social importance whether an action, for example, a 
questionable comment, was made as a representative of an organization or as a private 
person. But these are facts about the status attributed to the behavior, not about the two 
completely different entities producing the behavior. 
When a person causally interacts with an organization, she interacts with other 
persons (although this interaction is increasingly mediated via material artifacts such as 
ATM machines). There is no downward causal influence from a higher level. Everything 
happens at the same level; it is just that the intentional attitudes and relations of a larger 
group of people are important to the details of the local situation. Similarly, the influence 
of the organization on its members happens through other members, no matter how high 
up some of the members are in the organizational hierarchy. While the rules (and their 
interpretation by others) are external to any individual person, there is no need to posit 
them as a separate ontological category. These observations suggest that even in the case 
of organizations, the layer-cake model of the social world is not very illuminating. What 
is interesting about organizations is the habits and mental representations of their 
members, the resources they control as members of the organization, and their (materially 
mediated) interactions, not some higher ontological level. 
Again it is good to return to real social scientific questions. They concern issues 
such as: How do large-scale collective enterprises—for example, organizations—manage 
(or fail) to achieve certain things? What kinds of unintended consequences do these 
collective activities have? How does a membership in such collective enterprises 
influence the individual members? The explanatory answers to these questions often refer 
to organizations and their properties, but there is no problem in conceiving them as large-
scale things influencing smaller-scale things or other large-scale things. 
These examples of macro social facts suggest a kind of flat view of society in 
which the difference between micro and macro is one of scale, not of different levels. The 
large-scale facts about distributions, frequencies, interactions, and relations have an 
irreducible explanatory contribution to make, but there is nothing comparable to the 
mind-brain relation. As a consequence, the metaphor of levels that underlies the layer-
cake model does not really help to make sense of the issues that social scientists 
addressing social macro facts are facing. Giving it up will have a number of beneficial 
consequences. 
First, there are some philosophical advantages. As I will argue in the next section, 
once we give up the image of levels, we get rid of the problem of causal exclusion that 
arises from the image of causally competing levels. There is no problem of downward 
causation as there are only causal influences from large-scale things to small-scale things 
and descriptions of large-scale things at various levels of abstraction. The problem is 
replaced with the more down to earth problem of explanatory selection: Under which 
description can we formulate the most robust claims about counterfactual dependence? 
Secondly, we no longer have to face the problem of finding an acceptable definition of 
the comprehensive individual level so that we can argue for or against methodological 
individualism. We can start analyzing real social scientific explanations instead and focus 
our attention on the possible contributions that large-scale things make to those on a 
smaller scale and what kinds of causal mechanisms mediate these influences. 
This change in framing also has some advantages when considering relations 
between disciplines. The division of labor between psychology and the social sciences is 
justified by differences in scale and the importance of large-scale relations and 
interactions, not in terms of independent and autonomous levels of reality. This 
guarantees that the social sciences will never be reduced to psychological sciences. 
However, thinking in terms of scale also cuts down the false aspirations of disciplinary 
autonomy. When the social scientists are denied their own autonomous level of reality, 
the ideal of completely psychology-free social science becomes less appealing. It should 
be an empirical matter whether the details of human cognition matter for social 
explanation. It might be that is some cases it makes good mechanistic sense to 
incorporate some processes on the sub-personal level in the explanatory theory. I will 
return to this possibility in the final section. 
2.4 Causation, constitution, and microfoundations 
One prominent idea in the recent philosophy of biology debate about mechanisms has not 
been employed in the philosophy of social sciences debate.1 This is the distinction 
between causation and constitution. Although the difference between constitutive and 
causal explanation has been noted earlier (Salmon 1984; see also Cummins 1983), it has 
only recently become a topic of systematic study (Craver 2007). 
Both causation and constitution are relations of dependence (or determination), 
and they are easily confused. However, there are some crucial ontological differences. 
Causation is a relation between events; it is about changes in properties. Causation takes 
time, so we talk about causal processes. Finally, causation is characterized by the 
asymmetry of manipulation: The effect can be manipulated by manipulating the cause, 
but not the other way around (Woodward 2003). 
In contrast, constitution relates properties. The properties (and relations) of parts 
constitute the properties of the system (sometimes also the relations to the environment 
are important). The whole is made of its parts and their relations. Unlike causation, 
constitution does not take time, and we do not talk about the process of constitution. 
Furthermore, the relata of constitution are not ‘independent existences’ (as Hume called 
them). For this reason we cannot characterize the relation of constitution with the help of 
the asymmetry of manipulation. For example, the molecular structure of glass constitutes 
its fragility: To be fragile is to have a particular molecular structure; the fragility is not a 
consequence of the molecular structure. However, there is another sort of asymmetry: the 
asymmetry of existence. The parts preexist the system in the sense that the parts can exist 
independently of the system, but the system cannot exist independently of its parts 
(although the system can exist independently of particular parts). 
An interesting sort of regress characterizes both causation and constitution. In the 
case of causation, we talk about chains of causation. This is based on the idea that for 
every event that is a cause, there is another event that is its cause. A similar idea applies 
to constitution; we assume that all parts can be further decomposed into their parts and 
their organization. We could call these chains of constitution. Now a tricky question is 
whether there exists a first cause that is not itself caused, and a similar problem can be 
stated concerning the ultimate building blocks of reality, but in this context we can leave 
them aside. There is no danger that such ultimate things will show up in the social 
sciences. However, these regress properties create chains of explanations, which are 
relevant from the point of view of the social sciences. The crucial thing in this context is 
to understand that although there is always an explanation for every social scientific 
explanatory factor, this does not imply that their explanatory status depends on us 
knowing the explanation for them. Both in the case of causation and constitution, an 
explanation presupposes that the explanans facts are the case, not that we have to have an 
explanation for those facts. I will return to this issue in the next section. 
Explanation is about tracking relations of dependence. Although metaphysically 
the relations of constitution and causation are quite different, in terms of explanation the 
basic principles are quite similar. Both explanations attempt to track networks of 
counterfactual dependence. A causal explanation tells us how the antecedent events and 
their organization (timing and location) bring about the event to be explained. In 
contrast, a constitutive explanation describes how the properties of the components and 
their organization give rise to the system’s properties. 
In both cases we are looking for the difference-makers: The criterion of 
explanatory selection is counterfactual. As the precise explanandum is best characterized 
in contrastive terms (why x is the case rather than x*), we are interested in the differences 
that would have made the difference we are interested in (Woodward 2003; Ylikoski 
2007; Northcott this volume). In the case of causation these differences are in antecedent 
events; in the case of constitution these differences are in the properties of parts (or in 
their organization). Also in both cases it makes sense to ask a further question: Why does 
the counterfactual dependence hold? The answers to these questions will in both cases 
draw from the same body of mechanical knowledge, so it is understandable that in the 
philosophy of biology debates both explanations are called mechanical explanations. So, 
despite the important metaphysical differences, the same basic ideas about explanation 
can be applied to both cases. 
Not only are the principles of explanatory relevance similar, so are the 
explanatory questions. This leads easily to confusion. Consider the question: “Why is this 
glass fragile?” The question is ambivalent: It could either mean “How did the glass 
become fragile?” or it could mean “What makes the glass fragile?” The first question is 
causal; the latter question constitutive. The answer to the causal question will tell us 
about the causal history of the glass—it will specify the crucial features of the process 
that led to the object being fragile rather than robust. The answer to the constitutive 
question will not focus on earlier events. It will detail the relevant aspects of the object’s 
molecular structure that makes it fragile. So while the explanation-seeking questions may 
look the same, the request for explanatory information is quite different. Without a clear 
understanding of the differences between causation and constitution, some confusion is 
bound to occur. This is also the case in philosophy of social sciences. For example, it is 
quite a different thing to explain how a regime became stable than to explain what makes 
it stable. While some of the facts cited by both explanations might be the same, they are 
addressing different explananda: One is focused on how the causal capacity was acquired 
and the other on the basis of that causal capacity. A social scientist is usually interested in 
both questions, but she should not confuse them with each other. 
For all social macro properties, one can ask both constitutive and causal why- and 
how-questions. (Although for some statistical properties the constitutive questions are 
relatively trivial.) The first sort of questions asks how the macro properties are 
constituted by the micro-level entities, activities, and relations. The aim is to track how 
the details of macro-level facts depend on the micro details. The question is often how the 
macro facts would have been different if some of the micro facts had been different in 
some specific way. These questions can also be characterized in terms of interventions: 
How would the macro facts change if some of the micro facts were changed? Notice that 
here intervention is a causal notion (all change happens in time), but the dependence of 
interest is constitutive. 
A clear example of constitutive explanation is an explanation for the difference in 
the problem-solving capacities of two groups. The crucial difference might be in the 
properties of the members, such as their intelligence or social skills. Alternatively, the 
pivotal factors might be the informal social norms that characterize the interactions 
within the group or its formal organization. Of course, the explanation may also be found 
in some combination of these factors. Just like in this example, the usual explananda of 
constitutive explanations are causal capacities and dispositions of the whole. The 
constitutive explanation tells us what gives the whole (population, group, organization, or 
society) those properties, and the answer is found in the causal capacities of the parts and 
their organization. 
The explanantia in constitutive explanations are always at the micro level. As the 
explanation attempts to capture what the whole is made of, an appeal to the properties of 
the whole does not really make sense. In this sense, the methodological individualists, 
and other reductionists, have been on the right track. On the other hand, the explanation 
of macro properties does not in any way diminish their reality: The wholes are as real as 
their parts. This implies that those methodological individualists who have suggested that 
a micro explanation somehow eliminates the macro properties are either metaphysically 
confused or just choosing their words badly. The talk about macro reducing to micro 
makes as little sense as the talk about reducing effects to their causes. 
The causal questions about the macro social properties are concerned with their 
origin, persistence, and change. These explanations are tracking counterfactual 
dependencies between events. How would have the outcome been different if some of the 
causes had been different in some specified manner? What kind of difference would an 
intervention on some antecedent facts make? The explanantia in these causal 
explanations are always antecedent events. 
This is the context in which confusion between constitution and causation can 
create trouble. If we are considering simple causal statements about causal dependence, 
individualists tend to make the claim that the causes have to be at the micro level. 
However, nothing in the notion of causation implies that the real causal work is always to 
be found at the micro level. Of course, the notion of constitution implies that every time 
we have a cause at a macro level, we also have micro level facts that constitute it. If we 
stick to the counterfactual criterion of explanatory selection, as I think we should, there is 
no a priori reason to privilege micro-level causes (Woodward 2003, 2008). It is sufficient 
that there is an appropriate counterfactual dependence between the macro variable and 
the explanandum. Of course, in many cases the justification of a claim about this causal 
dependence might require some knowledge of the underlying mechanisms. However, this 
observation about the justification of a causal claim should not be confused with the 
claim itself. Similarly, although adding mechanistic details to the explanation will 
involve references to micro-level processes, this does not imply that the macro facts will 
lose their explanatory relevance. They will still be possible difference-makers and 
legitimate explanatory factors. In other words, although the information about the 
relevant mechanistic details improves the explanation significantly, it does not remove 
the causal relevance of the initial invariance involving macro-level facts. 
In the counterfactual account of causal relevance, the location of explanatory 
relevance at the micro or macro level is a contingent matter that depends on the 
explananda that one is addressing. There is no reason to assume that the most invariant 
counterfactual dependence (with respect to the contrastively specified explanandum) will 
always be found at the micro level. Similarly, one has to give up the often presented 
suggestion that levels of explanation should match so that macro would always explain 
macro and micro would always explain micro. The issues of explanatory relevance (how 
the explanatory factors are selected, at which level of abstraction they are described, etc.) 
are always determined by the facts of the case and the details of the intended 
explanandum, not by generic philosophical arguments. 
2.4.1 The proper role of microfoundations 
Is the above argument about the legitimacy of macro-level causal facts compatible with 
the mechanistic call for microfoundations? I want to argue that it is fully compatible with 
the core ideas of mechanism-based thinking. Contrary to the common assumption, the 
point of mechanistic microfoundations is not that we have more real causes at the micro 
level, but to have a better grasp of the explanatory dependence underlying the causal 
relation involving macro variables. Consequently, the advocates of mechanism-based 
explanations should not call into question the reality of macro-level causal relations. 
Instead, they should emphasize the importance of microfoundations for understanding 
these dependencies. There are a number of reasons why microfoundations are important. 
First, all causal relations involving macro properties are mechanism-mediated 
causal relations. Understanding how the dependence involving macro variables is 
constituted helps to understand why that particular dependence holds (Ylikoski 2011). It 
also integrates the piece of causal information contained in the macro-level generalization 
to other pieces of explanatory knowledge (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010). This is 
certainly a form of explanatory understanding that we should be interested in if we take 
the notion of explanatory social science seriously. 
However, the utility of this information is not limited to the expanded theoretical 
understanding. It also often tells about the conditions under which the causal dependence 
in question will hold. There are three dimensions to this knowledge. First, there is 
knowledge about the range of values of the explanandum variable that are possible 
without the dependence breaking apart. Second, there is knowledge about the sensitivity 
of the dependence to changes in background conditions. Finally, there is possible 
knowledge about alternative interventions that could bring about similar effects. Without 
knowledge of these issues, the explanatory use of the macro-level explanatory 
generalization can be very risky business. It is very difficult to extrapolate to other cases 
without understanding the background mechanisms (Ylikoski 2011; see also Cartwright, 
this volume, Kincaid, this volume). 
Apart from an expanded understanding and the security of an explanatory claim, 
the insight into the underlying mechanisms might also help to improve the explanatory 
generalization. With the help of a mechanistic understanding, one might be able to make 
the explanandum more precise or to reformulate the explanatory generalization in such a 
manner that it allows a broader range of values of the explanandum variables or 
background conditions (Ylikoski 2011). 
These considerations justify the presumption that microfoundations are important 
for proper explanatory understanding. However, they do not demolish the explanatory 
relevance of macro facts. On the contrary, they put them in the right context as the 
mechanisms bridge the large-scale micro facts to causal interactions between persons and 
to their decision-making processes. I think this is the point James Coleman (1990) 
attempted to make with his often misunderstood graph. 
[Insert Figure 2.1 here: Macro-Micro Linkages] 
Following Hedström and Swedberg (1998, 23), I refer to the arrows in figure 2.1 
as situational mechanisms (arrow 1), action-formation mechanisms (arrow 2), and 
transformational mechanisms (arrow 3). The situational mechanisms describe how social 
structures constrain individuals’ action sand cultural environments shape their desires and 
beliefs, the action-formation mechanisms describe how individuals choose their preferred 
courses of action among the feasible alternatives, and the transformational mechanisms 
describe how individual actions produce various intended and unintended social 
outcomes. 
Coleman was critical of nonmechanistic explanations that remain at the level of 
macro regularities. However, there is no reason to assume that he was denying the causal 
relevance of macro social facts. Rather, his point was to make it clear that proper 
sociological understanding requires that we understand both the mechanisms by which 
large-scale social facts influence the local decision-making processes of individual agents 
(the situational mechanisms) and the mechanisms by which individual actions create and 
influence macro social facts (the transformational mechanisms). He was calling for 
mechanisms that bridge the levels, not just descriptions that somehow reduce the macro 
facts to individual level facts. Only when we understand the relevant mechanisms, do we 
have a satisfactory theoretical grasp of the social phenomena in question. 
Coleman’s criticism of Weber’s (partial) explanation of the emergence of modern 
capitalism in Western Europe illuminates these points. Weber started with an idea that 
was commonplace in late nineteenth-century Germany: There is a close connection 
between Protestantism, entrepreneurism, and the rise of capitalism. To substantiate this 
vague explanatory suggestion, Weber asked what changes the emergence of 
Protestantism brought about in the beliefs, desires, and communal practices of individual 
agents. This question has both causal and constitutive dimensions that are not clear in 
Coleman’s analysis. However, Coleman’s focus is on Weber’s second causal question: 
How did these changed life practices of individuals influence economic activities and 
institutions and how did these changes in turn facilitate the formation of modern 
capitalism? Coleman’s central point was that Weber was not clear enough about this last 
passage of the causal chain. He was not able to give a sufficiently clear account of the 
transformative mechanisms that connected the Protestant ethic to the rise of modern 
capitalism. In other words, Weber was not able to show how the changes at the micro 
level (the life practices of Protestants) bought about a major macro-level outcome (the 
early forms of modern capitalism). As the crucial mechanism is lacking, so is the 
legitimacy of Weber’s causal claim about history. 
Here it is important to see the difference between the justificatory and explanatory 
roles of mechanisms. Coleman’s analysis shows why it is legitimate to challenge Weber’s 
causal claim. Knowledge of the causal mechanisms have an important role in the 
justification of historical causal claims, so pointing to the missing details of the causal 
chain constitutes a challenge to the legitimacy of the causal claim. However, this 
criticism of a singular causal claim does not imply that Coleman generally considers 
macro-level facts to be nonexplanatory or causally impotent. He is simply challenging the 
justification of this particular historical hypothesis. 
2.5 Intentional fundamentalism 
Arguments for methodological individualism often appeal to the special explanatory 
status of intentional explanations. I call this position intentional fundamentalism. 
According to intentional fundamentalism, the proper level of explanation in the social 
sciences is the level of the intentional action of individual agents. The intentional 
fundamentalist assumes that explanations given at the level of individual action are 
especially satisfactory, fundamental, or even ultimate. In contrast to explanations that 
refer to supra-individual social structures, properties, or mechanisms, there is no need to 
provide microfoundations for intentional explanations. They provide rock-bottom 
explanations. In other words, according to intentional fundamentalism, the intentional 
explanations of individual actions are privileged explanations. 
Although intentional fundamentalism can take various forms, it is often related to 
rational choice theory. French social theorist Raymond Boudon (1998, 177) expresses the 
idea clearly: “When a sociological phenomenon is made the outcome of individual 
reasons, one does not need to ask further questions.” The idea is that in the case of supra-
individual explanations there is always a black box that has to be opened before the 
explanation is acceptable, but in the case of intentional explanation there is no such a 
problem: “The explanation is final” (Boudon 1998, 172). Diego Gambetta appeals to 
same sort of finality (1998, 104): “Not only will a rational choice explanation be 
parsimonious and generalizable; it will also be the end of the story.”2 
My claim in this section is that intentional fundamentalism is not compatible with 
the causal mechanistic account of explanation. As intentional fundamentalism is often 
advocated by rational choice theorists and as many believe that rational choice 
explanations are the best examples of mechanical explanations in the social sciences, this 
incompatibility claim is of some interest. If my argument is valid, it suggests that the 
relation of rational choice theory and a mechanism-based philosophy of science requires 
some rethinking. It also implies that one common argument for methodological 
individualism is much less credible than is commonly assumed. 
2.5.1 The regress argument 
To make sense of intentional fundamentalism, we should start with the explanatory 
regress argument for methodological individualism. Methodological individualists often 
make the case that nonindividualist explanations are either explanatorily deficient or not 
explanatory at all. At most, they allow that explanations referring to macro social facts 
are placeholders for proper (individualistic) explanatory factors. In this view, the 
explanatory contribution of supra-individual explanations is at best derived: They are 
explanatory because they are (in principle) backed up by a truly explanatory story. This is 
the regress of explanations argument: Unless grounded at the lower level, explanations at 
the macro level are not acceptable. The underlying general principle is the following: 
[P] A genuine explanation requires that the explanans is itself explained or is self-
explanatory. 
In short, the explanatory buck has to stop somewhere. 
The principle [P] is general, and it raises the possibility of an explanatory regress 
that is only halted at a fundamental (physical) level. This would be highly unintuitive, so 
for the intentional fundamentalist the buck stops at the level of (self-interested) rational 
intentional action. This level is treated as inherently understandable, as shown in the 
above quotations from Boudon. The inherent intelligibility of intentional action explains 
why the search for microfoundations should stop at the level of the individual. The 
special status of intentional explanation also makes the explanatory regress argument safe 
for the methodological individualist: He can use the argument’s full force against anti-
individualists who cannot make a similar claim about a privileged status, and it does not 
challenge the legitimacy of his favored explanatory factors. 
The fundamentalist argument for individualism fails for a number of reasons. The 
first reason is that the principle [P] is not valid. The explanatory relation between the 
explanans and the explanandum is independent from the question of whether the 
explanans is itself explained. An explanation of X in terms of Y presupposes that Y is the 
case, but it does not presuppose that Y is itself explained. Of course, it would be great 
also to have an explanation for Y, but this is a separate issue from the legitimacy of the 
explanatory relationship between Y and X. The distinctness of these issues implies that 
the regress does not begin. 
Why whould anyone believe in [P]? One plausible suggestion is the following: 
The belief in [P] arises from a straightforward confusion between justification-seeking 
and explanation-seeking why-questions. It makes sense to ask how well justified are 
those things that one appeals to in justification of one’s beliefs. It also makes sense to ask 
whether one is justified in believing the things that one appeals to in one’s explanation. 
However, justifying one’s belief in Y, is not the same as explaining why Y is the case. 
2.5.2 Intentional explanations without a special status 
Another reason for the failure of the regress argument is that intentional explanations lack 
the special properties assumed by the argument. If one accepts the mechanistic account of 
explanation, as many advocates of rational choice sociology do, such a special status does 
not make any sense. The assumption that human deliberation is a black box that should 
not be opened is more in line with nineteenth-century hermeneutic romanticism than with 
causally oriented social science. Of course, the chain of mechanistic explanations will 
end somewhere (if there is such a thing as a fundamental level), but that stopping point is 
not the level of individual rational action. 
A mechanistic explanation appeals to micro-level processes, but nothing in the 
notion of mechanistic explanation implies that these micro things would always be facts 
about the intentional actions of individuals. Mechanisms that cite supra-individual 
entities or properties are certainly possible (Mayntz 2004). For example, various filtering 
mechanisms that are analogical to natural selection are difficult to understand other than 
as population-wide processes, and when the units that are selected are organizations (for 
example, firms), it is natural to conceive the mechanism as supra-individual. Similarly, 
the crucial parts of the explanatory mechanism could well be located below the level of 
intentional psychology. For example, various facts about human information 
processing—for example, implicit biases (see Kelly and Mallon, this volume)—could 
well be relevant for explanatory understanding of intentional action. There is no valid 
reason to give up mechanistic thinking in the case of intentional action. 
Another reason to challenge intentional fundamentalism is the implicit realism of 
mechanistic thinking. For mechanists, explanation is factive. It is not enough that the 
explanation saves the phenomenon: It should also represent the essential features of the 
actual causal structure that produces the observed phenomena. So, if the explanation 
refers to the goals, preferences, or beliefs of agents, the agents should indeed have those 
mental states. Mere as-if storytelling does not suffice for a mechanistic explanation as it 
does not capture the relevant parts of the causal process. This realist attitude goes against 
the instrumentalist attitude common among many rational choice theorists. The fact that 
one can rationalize any behavior does not imply that those rationalizations are also the 
correct causal explanations for those behaviors. Similarly, the human fluency in coming 
up with intentional accounts for our behavior is not a reason for regarding them as 
superior explanations. 
It is important to understand the limited nature of my argument. I am not denying 
that intentional explanations are, and will be, an indispensable part of the social scientific 
explanatory repertoire. For me, intentional explanations are legitimate causal 
explanations. Furthermore, the intentional attitudes of individuals play an important role 
in most mechanism-based explanations of social phenomena. The only thing I am 
challenging is the supposed special explanatory status of intentional or rational accounts 
of human action. In the mechanistic account of explanation, the importance of certain 
sorts of explanatory factors is not a basis for their privileged status. 
Neither should my rejection of intentional fundamentalism be regarded as a 
wholesale attack on the use of rational choice theory. For many social scientific purposes, 
a rather simple version of intentional psychology is both preferable and sufficient. For 
example, when one is attempting to make sense of social complexity, it is understandable 
that social scientists attempt to keep the psychological assumptions of their models very 
simple. Such idealizations are fully legitimate if they do not lead to a gross 
misrepresentation of the causal mechanism under consideration. However, the practical 
necessity of these idealizations does not constitute a justification for accepting intentional 
fundamentalism. 
Furthermore, my argument should not be regarded as an argument against the 
claim that there should exist a division of labor between the social sciences and the 
sciences of cognition. However, it follows from the flexibility of mechanistic levels that 
the boundaries of this division of labor are adjustable and not fixed. It is inherent in the 
idea of mechanistic explanation that all the gaps between levels of analysis3 are 
ultimately to be bridged by mechanistic interfield theories. So the challenge for the social 
sciences is not to define their objects of study in such a way that they are in no way 
touched by psychological sciences, but to look at ways in which social and cognitive 
mechanisms can be meaningfully combined. This is not as easy as it sounds, as recent 
attempts to combine neuroscience and economics show (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2010). 
2.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have attempted to show what consequences the mechanism-based 
account of explanation would have on issues traditionally discussed under the title of 
methodological individualism. Borrowing some ideas developed by philosophers who 
have studied the mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences, I have argued that we 
should give up the notion of a unique, privileged, and comprehensive individual level that 
has been a presupposition of the individualism debates. In addition, I have argued that 
rather than employing metaphors borrowed from the philosophy of mind for micro-macro 
relations, we should pay closer attention to how real macro social facts figure in social 
scientific theories and explanations. There the micro-macro issue is more an issue of 
bridging large-scale social facts to small-scale social interactions rather than that of 
finding a way to see relations between autonomous levels of reality. 
Notes 
1. There are some exceptions. For example, Wendt (1998) distinguishes between 
causation and constitution. However, his discussion of constitution is very confused. His 
notion of constitution covers not only the constitution of causal capacities, but also causal 
preconditions, definitions, and other conceptual relations. The standard philosophy of 
science notion that I am using is limited only to the constitution of causal capacities. 
2. The key issue here is not whether these authors would ultimately subscribe to 
intentional fundamentalism. I am only claiming that in these passages they argue as if 
intentional fundamentalism is correct. 
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